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The economic rise of China and its integration into the globalization 
process is undoubtedly one of the most important developments of the 
past decades.  The objective of the paper is to examine the changing 
nature and structure of the Korea-China trade and investment linkages, 
and to highlight the implications for the definition of Korea‟s economic 
policies vis-à-vis China, as well as vis-à-vis the rest of East Asia.    
The paper starts by describing China‟s new role in the regional supply 
chain and the resulting change in the trade and FDI flows between China 
and Korea.  It highlights the high degree of complementarity between the 
two economies and the nature of their respective participation in regional 
production networks.  The next section examines the impact of the 
China-Korea trade and investment linkages on Korea‟s regional 
economic policy.  It suggests that the criticism against floating rates is 
less relevant for trade among countries like Korea and China which 
share extensive production networks and are integrated in a triangular 
trade pattern with the Western markets.  Regarding trade, the 
development of tight regional production networks suggests that the 
case for traditional free trade areas is rather weak, while trade 
facilitation is certainly desirable.  In the wake of the current crisis, the 
shift in bilateral economic relations away from complementarity and 
towards rising rivalry may, however, substantially affect the game 
being played by the two countries.    
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The economic rise of China and its integration into the globalization 
process is undoubtedly one of the most important developments of the past 
decades. The resulting change in the global balance of economic activities 
has far-reaching implications for the world as a whole and for neighboring 
emerging economies in particular, with Korea as a case in point. Since the 
two countries established diplomatic relations in 1992, trade and investment 
linkages have substantially developed and the two economies have become 
increasingly interdependent. However, the tight economic linkages are 
primarily private sector-led rather than the result of government-driven 
initiatives.   
The objective of the paper is to examine the nature and structure of the 
Korea-China trade and investment linkages, and to highlight the implications 
for the definition of Korea‟s economic policies vis-à-vis China, as well as 
vis-à-vis the rest of East Asia. The prospects for further government-led 
regional economic integration will be examined from this perspective. In 
addition, the paper looks at how the changes induced by the current global 
financial crisis may impact Korea-China relations and the stakes of further 
cooperation.  
The paper starts by providing a comprehensive description of China‟s new 
role in the regional supply chain and the resulting change in the trade and 
FDI flows between China and Korea.  The next section examines the impact 
of the China-Korea trade and investment linkages described earlier on 
Korea‟s economic policies with an emphasis being placed in particular on 
trade and exchange rate policies.  
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2. KOREA–CHINA ECONOMIC RELATIONS:  
RISING INTERDEPENDENCE 
 
2.1. Dynamic Bilateral Trade 
 
Following the implementation of its open-door policy in the late 1970s, 
China is getting increasingly integrated in the world trade networks and it is 
now the world‟s fourth largest trading nation.  The country‟s exports and 
imports have surged since the early 1990s, with the US, Japan and the EU (in 
that order) as major destinations, and with Japan, the EU and emerging East 
Asia as major suppliers of imports.  
China ranks particularly high among emerging Asia‟s trading partners, but 
while it imports a lot from the rest of the region, from industrial and 
emerging economies alike, it does not export much to neighboring emerging 
Asian economies.  Over the period 1990-2006, the share of East Asia as a 
destination for Chinese exports has decreased from 67 to 38.9% and the 
Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) are the major losers.  At the same 
time East Asia‟s share as a source of imports has risen from 55.4 to 58.1% of 
total Chinese imports.  As a result, China runs a trade deficit with the region 
as a whole and in particular vis-à-vis Korea.  
With the exception of Hong Kong, Korea has undoubtedly benefited more 
from the opening up of the Chinese economy than any other East Asian 
economy.  China‟s trade with Korea has soared since the two countries 
resumed diplomatic relations in the early 1990s but the real takeoff in 
bilateral trade took place in early 2000s as can be seen on figure 1.  
The bilateral trade between China and Korea amounted to close to 190 
billion US$ in 2008 (compared to 17 billion in 1995).  Korean exports to 
China rose to close to 107 billion US$ in 2008, while Korean imports from 
China reached 83 US$ billions.  Korea is nowadays the second source of 
imports for China, behind Japan but ahead of the US.  From the Korean 
perspective, China now ranks first among the country‟s export markets, 
ahead of the US (table 1).  Korea is the East Asian country with the largest 
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Figure 1 Korea’s Trade with China, 1991-2008 
 
Table 1 Korean Exports by Destination, 1992-2008 (% share) 
1992 2000 2008 
USA 23,6 USA 21,8 China 21,7 
Japan 15,1 Japan 11,9 USA 11,0 
Hong Kong 7,7 China 10,7 Japan 6,7 
Singapore 4,2 Hong Kong 6,2 Hong Kong 4,7 
Germany 3,8 Taiwan 4,7 Singapore 3,9 
China 3,5 Singapore 3,3 Taiwan 2,7 
Top6 57,9  58,6  50,6 
Source: KITA.  
 
pro-China export bias (Haddad, 2007).  This tight connection with fast-rising 
China has undoubtedly helped Korea‟s recovery after the 1997-1998 
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financial crisis and has certainly contributed to the country‟s persistently 
strong growth record over the past few years.
1)
 The flip-side of this 
increasingly tight economic relationship is first that Korea is now more 
dependent on the fate of the Chinese economy and second that the risk of 
frictions is higher than in the past.  In particular, China‟s chronic trade deficit 
with Korea has fuelled complaints in the former country, leading to the 
imposition of anti-dumping measures and causing festering in the relations 
between the two countries.
2)
   
 
2.2. Korean FDI in China  
 
Another important form of interaction between the two economies is 
foreign direct investment.  FDI into China tends to be dominated by Asian 
investors,
3)
 and Korea plays an increasing role in this respect.  No fewer than 
20 000 Korean companies were reported to be operating in China in 2008.  If 
Hong Kong is excluded, Korea now ranks as the second individual investor 
in China, on the heels of Japan, but far ahead of the US, as shown in table 2. 
Similarly, from Korea‟s perspective, China looms large as an investment 
destination.  It now ranks first, ahead of more traditional destinations such as 
the US in particular (figure 2).
4)
  Korean firms are attracted both by China‟s 
low labor costs and by the favorable treatment granted in designated export-
processing zones.  Korean investments in China are still primarily efficiency-
seeking rather than market-seeking.
5)
  
                                                          
1) According to some estimates, exports to China accounted for about 40% of Korea‟s export 
growth over the past few years.  
2)
 Out of the 151 AD actions initiated by China since January 1995, 27 targeted Korea 
(compared to 28 for Japan and 22 for the US).  Similarly, out of the 108 anti-dumping 
actions initiated by Korea, 23 targeted China (14 Japan, and 13 the US).   
3) The importance of (mainly Asian) FDI inflows to China may be inflated to some extent by 
“round tripping”, that is Chinese companies moving funds out of China to Hong Kong or 
other tax heavens and returning to China as FDI to take advantage of preferential tax 
treatment (Chia Siow Yue, 2004).  On the other hand, however, FDI originating in the 
Virgin Islands can be expected to be to a large extent of Taiwanese origin.  
4) China overtook the US as Korea‟s preferred destination for outward investment in 2003.  
5) In this respect they differ form FDI from the US and the EU which tend to target the large 
Chinese market.  
Françoise Nicolas 
 
346 
Table 2 FDI into China by Source Country, 1983-2007  
(Unit: %) 
 1983-1991 1992-2003 2004-2007 
Hong Kong 58.7 45.1 32.8 
Taiwan 0.0 7.6 3.5 
Singapore 1.2 5.0 3.7 
Japan 13.4 7.8 7.8 
Korea 0.0 3.6 7.3 
Sub-total 73.1 69.1 58.2 
United States 11.1 8.8 4.8 
Virgin Islands 0.0 5.7 16.8 
Note: Data for realized FDI.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, various issues.  
 
Figure 2 Korea’s Outward Direct Investment, 1988-2008,  
by Destination 
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In the case of China, the trade-FDI nexus is particularly tight for two major 
reasons.  First, foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) tend to be more export-
oriented than Chinese firms.  It is usually reported that FIEs account for 
about 60% of China‟s exports.  As a result, FDI inflows tend to be positively 
correlated with Chinese exports.  Secondly, FIEs also tend to be much more 
dependent on imported inputs so that FDI inflows are also positively 
correlated with China‟s imports from neighboring economies.  As shown in a 
number of analyses, the share of domestic value-added is much lower in the 
production of wholly foreign-owned firms operating in China (and to a lesser 
extent in that of joint venture firms) than in the production of domestic firms, 
be they state-owned firms collectively-owned firms or private firms.  
According to the latest estimates by Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008), the 
share of domestic value-added is 27.8% in the former case, and between 70 
and 82% for the latter.  
The complementarity between trade and investment is confirmed in the 
Sino-Korean relation.  As explained by Park (2007), “Regardless of the type 
of investment, Korean investments in China have created intra-firm trade.  
Labor-intensive companies that expanded into China to export finished goods 
to the United States, to third party nations, or back to Korea, tend to rely on 
their parent companies or other Korean firms for intermediate goods.  Since 
the target of third country trade is the same as the export market for Korean 
goods, this type of trade replaces traditional exports, and may even lead to 
increases in imports as these finished goods are imported back into Korea.  
However, the export of parts and components to China is resulting in export 
expansion.  Generally exports of parts and intermediate goods by parent 
companies are expected to be greater than increases in imports of finished 
goods from China.”  
These characteristics have obvious implications for the composition and 
nature of trade flows as will be seen below.  
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Figure 3 Korea’s Parts Exports to and ODI into China (1991-2008) 
 
2.3. Composition of Trade: the Rise of Intra-industry Trade in  
Electronics Products 
 
It is now a well-documented fact that the rise in East Asia intra-regional 
trade since the early 1990s has been largely driven by rapidly growing trade 
in parts, components and intermediate products that is a reflection of greater 
vertical specialization and the dispersion of production processes across 
borders.  The bulk of China‟s imports from neighboring East Asia is indeed 
made of parts, components, and raw materials and this holds particularly true 
for Korea.  
The composition of bilateral trade has substantially changed over the past 
fifteen years.  First, while Korea used to export textile products to China in 
the 1990s, it now primarily exports electronic products, as well as refined 
petroleum products and a few chemical products.  During the 1997-2002 
period, parts and intermediate goods accounted for 69 to 76% of Korea‟s 
exports of manufactured goods to China (Lee, 2003).  Today, Korea‟s 
exports tend to be dominated by parts and components and by capital goods: 
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the former accounted for 36% of the total in 2006 (up from less than 5% in 
1992) and the latter for 16.7% (up from 7.3%).  In parallel, the share of semi-
finished dropped from 84% in 1992 to 43.3% in 2006 (Song, 2008).  
When considered in greater details, Korean exports to China are 
increasingly concentrated in electronics products.  Among those, of particular 
note are intermediate goods, comprising active components (SITC 776), as 
well as parts for electronic data processing and office equipment (759), and 
parts for telecom related devices (764).  These three categories of 
intermediate goods accounted for 15% of Korea‟s total exports in 2000 and 
19% in 2008.  In addition, electrical machinery and apparatus (778) and 
television receivers (761) also loom large among major export products 
(table 3).  
 
Table 3 Top 10 Korean Export Products to China (3-digit SITC) 
1992 2000 2008 
676 776 871 
673 334 764 
571 511 334 
611 611 776 
653 764 511 
674 513 778 
266 657 513 
511 571 759 
641 653 761 
334 759 772 
Note: SITC codes 871 (Optical instruments and apparatus, n.e.s.), 764 (parts for telecom 
related devices), 334 (Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other 
than crude), 776 (transistors, integrated circuits, etc.), 511 (Hydrocarbons, n.e.s. and 
their halogenated sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivative), 778 (Electrical 
machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.), 513 (Carboxylic acids and derivatives thereof), 759 
(parts suitable for electronic data processing and office equipment), 761 (television 
receivers), 772 (switches, relays, fuses, etc.).  
 Source: KITA.  
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Table 4 Top Ten Korean Import Products from China (SITC 3-digit) 
1992 2000 2008 
044 776 673 
653 321 776 
654 044 778 
333 764 764 
661 759 676 
321 752 321 
651 671 752 
652 841 772 
081 778 684 
334 034 759 
Source: KITA. 
 
Although China is no longer a net importer of electronics products, it is 
still a net importer of electronics components.  China primarily sources its 
components from its neighboring countries, in particular from Korea with 
regards to telecom equipment parts
6)
 (Gangnes and van Asche, 2008).  
Korean main import products from China have also changed substantially, 
shifting away from clothing and primary products in the 1990s to electronic 
products such as computers, semi-conductors or telecommunication 
appliances.  The share of primary goods (primarily agricultural products: 
maize (044), fish (034)) decreased sharply from 37.1% in 1992 to 6.3% in 
2006.  The share of final goods increased from 12.6% to 36.2%, but parts and 
components and capital goods are the import goods with the most rapid 
growth. (Song, 2008, p. 77).  While they were dominated by light industry 
goods in the 1990s, Korean imports from China are now heavily 
concentrated in IT industry and electronic goods, but of a different kind than 
those exported by Korea (table 4).  
                                                          
6) In contrast, ASEAN countries tend to export active components and Japan passive 
components.  
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The presence of electronic products and parts (776, 764, 778, 772, and 
759) as export as well as import products points to a rise in intra-industry 
trade between the two economies.  When diplomatic relations were 
established between the two nations in 1992, intra-industry trade accounted 
for 12.9% of total trade, but rose to 64% in 2006, reflecting a significant 
structural change in the trade between the two nations.  Another important 
feature is that within intra-industry trade, vertical intra-industry trade 
increased more rapidly than horizontal intra-industry trade.  The percentage 
of VIIT in 1992 only amounted to 9.3%, but rose to 21.5% in 1995 and over 
40% in 2004.  In contrast, HIIT rose from 3.6% in 1992 to 13.9% in 2001, 
but fell after 2003 to 9.6% in 2006 (Park, 2007).  The predominance of VIIT 
over HIIT is characteristic of production-sharing prevailing in East Asia.  
 
2.4. Korea and China, Partners rather than Competitors 
 
Although China‟s export profile appears to be increasingly similar to 
Korea‟s according to traditional similarity indices, this new state of play 
must be assessed in association with the previous observations about the rise 
in intra-regional intra-industry trade.  As emphasized by Weiss and Shanwen 
(2003), China‟s gains of market share in the US market are misleading 
because they are due to exports of assembled parts and components 
originally produced in neighboring East Asian economies, with Korea as a 
case in point.  
The close correlation between the fluctuations in Chinese exports to the 
US and in Korean exports to China (see figure 4) points to the existence of an 
indirect trading relation and supports the hypothesis that China is being used 
as an export-processing zone by a number of Korean producers.  At the 
aggregate level, Chinese exports and Korean exports appear to be quite 
closely correlated, suggesting that they may be subject to common shocks but 
also that their productive structures are complementary.
7)
  The complementarity 
                                                          
7) As a result of this complementarity, the rise in exports to China may more than offset the 
market share losses in third markets.  See Ahearne et al. (2003) or Eichengreen et al. (2004) 
for further evidence on this point.  While the former fail to find a statistically significant 
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Figure 4 Changes in China’s and Korea’s Exports 
 
assumption is further supported by the observed rise in the complementarity 
index among Northeast Asian economies, in particular between Korea‟s 
exports and China‟s imports  (Sang-yirl Nam, 2004). 
This complementary relationship is particularly true in the electronics 
sector where China‟s production and exports of information technology 
hardware (primarily computer equipment) are based on imports of high 
value-added parts and components originating from emerging Asia (Korea, 
but also Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia or even the Philippines).
8)
   
In order to determine, whether China is really encroaching on Korea‟s 
export markets, it is necessary to remove the effects of rising intra-industry 
trade from the trade balance performances.  To that end, another similarity 
index needs to be calculated on the basis of net exports rather than on the 
                                                                                                                                         
impact of Chinese exports on East Asian exports, thus concluding that there is no evidence 
that increases in China‟s exports reduce the exports of other emerging economies, the latter 
show, through the use of a gravity model, that the rise in China‟s exports — and imports — 
positively affects the exports of its high-income neighbors but negatively affects the exports 
of less developed countries in the region.   
8) Electronic components account for more than 40% of Malaysia‟s and the Philippine‟s total 
exports to China, while it accounts for 32% of Singapore‟s exports to China.    
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basis of gross exports.  This approach allows comparison of economies‟ trade 
composition based on sectors in which they are exporting „value added‟.  
Such calculations by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the 
Australian Government lead to results which differ widely from those 
obtained making use of the gross exports.  In fact China‟s net export profile 
is found to diverge from that of Korea (as well as of Taiwan) since the early 
1990s, probably reflecting the latter‟s shift out of labor-intensive industries 
such as clothing and footwear in which China is still heavily specialized.  In 
this respect, the situation of Korea is clearly distinct from that of other 
countries in the region.  Further evidence confirms this state of affairs: the 
gains in China‟s market shares in electronics production can be shown to 
occur primarily at the expense of Japan and most NIEs, with the exception of 
South Korea (Gangnes and van Asche, 2008).  As a result Korea‟s net 
exports of mobile phones, digital and video cameras, computers and 
computer parts continue to expand strongly in the face of China‟s expansion 
in similar industries. 
The rise in Chinese electronic exports to the US and to a lesser extent to 
the EU should also not be interpreted as crowding out East Asian exports but 
simply as a redirection of such exports.  As far as Korea is concerned, the 
drop in its exports of consumer electronic products to the US can be shown 
to be offset by a rise in its exports of electronic components to China.  As 
explained by Gangnes and van Assche (2008), Korea is found to be a 
particularly active upgrader in the electronics industry with a rapidly rising 
technology index in contrast to that of Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong.  
Korea still exhibits a much higher sophistication level than that of China.  
Lastly, China‟s gains in market share require a further qualification: the 
bulk of Chinese exports are due to firms relocating from neighboring 
economies losing market share.  In other words, in addition to being import-
intensive, China‟s exports are mainly driven by Foreign Invested Enterprises 
(FIEs), most of which originates from Asia.
9)
  Indeed, Asian firms rank high 
                                                          
9) This remark concurs with C-H Kwan‟s observation that we need to distinguish between 
“made in China” and “made by Chinese” or “what China produces” and “what Chinese 
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among the export-oriented foreign firms, while Western MNCs tend to seek 
to target the domestic market.  This means that while a number of East Asian 
economies lose direct export competitiveness, their firms preserve and extend 
their competitive advantage and actually benefit the home country by 
promoting exports of intermediate products and related design and marketing 
activities and remitting dividends.  This is certainly the case for Korean firms, 
whose drop in US market shares results to a large extent from the 
fragmentation of production and from their relocation in China.  As a result, 
these firms now export from their Chinese production bases rather than from 
their home country‟s production bases.10)  
 
 
3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR 
CHANGE   
 
Given the specific nature of the de facto integration observed between 
China and Korea, an interesting issue is to examine the policy implications as 
well as the impact on the prospects for de jure cooperation between the two 
economies.  
 
3.1. Implications for Korea’s Economic Policies  
 
It follows from the previous remarks that the rise of China can be deemed 
for the time being to be more a boon than a bane for most emerging Asian 
economies, with Korea as a case in point.  As the fastest and the most 
steadily growing economy in the region (and even in the world), China has 
been an important export market and a major contributor to sustained growth 
in Korea.  However, this has been possible because Korea managed to take 
the appropriate steps to reap the full benefits of its integration with China.  
 
                                                                                                                                         
produce” (Kwan, 2004).  For a sobering assessment of the China‟s miracle, see Gilboy, 
2004. 
10) By way of illustration, Samsung now produces about 30% of its PCs in China.  
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3.1.1. Korea’s development strategy 
Despite the economic rise of China, neighboring East Asian economies 
necessarily maintain comparative advantages in some areas but the problem 
is that the resulting specialization may not square with their objectives and 
lead to what may be perceived as a “downgrading” of their industrial base.  
In Korea, a widely shared concern is that there may be no supporting 
activities to fill the gap opened by activities leaving the country.  The real 
challenge is thus to encourage the necessary adjustments that will help avoid 
such a development.  The other aspect of the challenge is the speed at which 
adjustment is imposed.  One cannot deny that the rise of China imposes a 
much quicker transition than would have been the case otherwise.  The real 
challenge for a country like Korea is to manage to find niche markets and to 
be flexible enough to face swift changes in comparative advantages imposed 
by the rapid intensification of competition from China.  A particularly strong 
pressure can be expected in labor-intensive sectors such as textiles and 
clothing, footwear, toys and plastic products.  As explained earlier, Korea has 
succeeded so far in shifting from low-technology activities to higher 
technology and more sophisticated activities, in particular in the electronics 
sector.   
Enhancing competitiveness is key, as a way of reaching more sophisticated 
and higher value added sectors of activities, and of maximizing the 
opportunities offered by the regional fragmentation of production processes.  
Production sharing arrangements may already be in place, but they can 
certainly be further deepened and/or restructured.  
 
3.1.2. The case for a China-Korea FTA?  
For the time being, the need for a FTA arrangement between China and 
Korea does not appear to be extremely pressing.  A major reason is that most 
of bilateral trade is already conducted duty free as a result of processing 
arrangements and/or as a result of the Information Technology Products 
Agreement (ITA).
11)
  As explained earlier, a substantial share of Korean 
                                                          
11) The ITA was concluded by 29 participants at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 
Françoise Nicolas 
 
356 
exports to China and of Chinese exports to Korea is made up of electronic 
products which fall under the ITA which provides for participants to 
completely eliminate duties on IT products covered by the Agreement.
12)
   By 
contrast, consumer products on which China imposes relatively high levels of 
tariff rates account for a negligible share.  
Also, very little Korean FDI in China results from tariff-jumping 
considerations for instance.  
For these various reasons, the elimination of tariffs between the two 
countries is unlikely to have a substantial impact on their bilateral trade, 
making the case for a China-Korea FTA relatively weak under the currently 
prevailing division of labor between the two countries.  
 
3.1.3. Implications for exchange rate policy choice 
More importantly perhaps, the distinct nature of the relationship between 
China and Korea has also a direct impact on the choice of an exchange rate 
policy.  Traditionally, when trade intensification leads to inter-industry 
specialization it is thought to exacerbate cyclical asymmetries thus enhancing 
the case for flexible exchange rates as a means of adjustment.
13)
  In contrast, 
when the rise in trade gives rise to intra-industry specialization it fosters 
business cycle synchronization and thus makes the case against flexible 
exchange rates (or for fixed exchange rates) more compelling.  
Although China and Korea are likely to be affected by symmetrical shocks, 
with a drop in external demand hitting simultaneously Chinese exports of 
final goods and East Asian exports of parts and components, the case for a 
fixed exchange rate is not particularly strong because Sino-Korean trade is 
                                                                                                                                         
December 1996.  The number of participants has grown to 70, representing about 97% of 
world trade in information technology products. 
12) The ITA is solely a tariff cutting mechanism. While the Declaration provides for the review 
of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), there are no binding commitments concerning NTBs.  There 
are three basic principles that one must abide by to become an ITA participant: 1) all 
products listed in the Declaration must be covered, 2) all must be reduced to a zero tariff 
level, and 3) all other duties and charges (ODCs) must be bound at zero.  There are no 
exceptions to product coverage, however for sensitive items, it is possible to have an 
extended implementation period (from the WTO website).  
13) Unless, of course, alternative adjustment instruments are available.  
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dominated by vertical intra-industry trade and not by horizontal intra-
industry trade.  
First, an important point of note is the change in the sensitivity of trade 
flows to exchange rate fluctuations as a result of the existence of production-
sharing between countries such as China and Korea.  Empirical evidence by 
Obashi (2009) confirms that intra-East Asian trade in parts and components 
is far less sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations than trade in finished 
products
14)
 suggesting that exchange rate stabilization is less of an issue (and 
priority) in this part of the world. 
Secondly, the specific position of China within the East Asian integrated 
circuit and the magnitude of processing in China‟s total trade impose 
different constraints on the conduct of its exchange rate policy, compared to 
other countries in the region such as Korea.  While pegging to the dollar (or 
manipulating the currency in order to avoid an appreciation) may still be 
appropriate for most East Asian economies which seek to preserve their 
competitiveness,
15)
 it is more debatable for China.  Given the importance of 
processing in China‟s trade, a unilateral appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-
vis the US dollar (as well as vis-à-vis the currencies of component supplying 
countries) is unlikely to have a large impact on China‟s exports to the US 
because the loss in competitiveness of Chinese exports will be partially offset 
by the decline in inputs costs resulting from the renminbi appreciation 
against East Asian component suppliers (Rahman and Thorbecke, 2007).  Of 
course, this holds true only if the Chinese currency appreciates both vis-à-vis 
the currencies of its export market as well as of its component suppliers.  
Should the renminbi appreciate only vis-à-vis the dollar but move in line 
with the currencies of the component supplying countries, the standard 
impact of an appreciation should be expected.  This configuration suggests 
first that Chinese exports may be more sensitive to changes in the won/dollar 
exchange rate for instance than to changes in the renminbi/dollar exchange 
rate, and second that it is not always in the interest of China to have the 
                                                          
14) This has probably to do with the substantial intra-firm nature of such trade. 
15) This is referred to as the “fear of floating” or rather the “fear of appreciation” (Pontines and 
Rajan, 2008).  
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renminbi moving in line with the currencies of component supplying 
countries.  Of course the situation may be different if ordinary exports were 
dominant; in the latter case a renminbi appreciation is found to cause a large 
decline in ordinary exports.
16)
  
The pivotal role now played by China in the region suggests that the need 
to manage the dollar exchange rate is probably stronger for East Asian 
economies than for China.  In this context some flexibility in the 
dollar/renminbi exchange rate may turn out to be less problematic than often 
claimed and the rationale for intra-regional exchange rate stabilization 
remains weak.  
 
3.2. Prospects for Change  
 
In the medium-term, competition from China may get increasingly fierce 
as China climbs the technological ladder and shifts away from mere 
assembly activities towards higher value-added activities, thereby reducing 
its imports of intermediate products.  At the same time, however, China is 
likely to become an increasingly important market for consumer products.  
More than a threat, the rise of China and the competitive pressure it exerts on 
neighboring economies constitutes a major challenge, imposing necessary 
(and possibly costly) adjustments.  
Chinese authorities are increasingly seeking to reduce the country‟s 
allegedly excessive dependence on imported inputs and to upgrade its 
industrial structure.  Some movement up the value chain is already under 
way in China and more upgrading can be expected in the coming years.  
Renewed declarations by the Chinese authorities to change gear and engage 
in a more resolute strategy of technological development point in this 
direction.  The 2005 11th Five Year Plan called for a shift of the 
development strategy away from its over-concentration on resource and 
energy-consuming industry, and towards a more knowledge-intensive and 
                                                          
16) Such differentiated impacts are obtained by Marquez and Schindler (2006), and Thorbecke 
and Smith (2008).  
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environmentally-friendly growth path (Naughton, 2007).  This may be seen 
as an attempt to put an end to the “growth at all costs” strategy and to give 
some substance to the Government‟s new economic mantra emphasizing the 
achievement of a harmonious society and a better balanced economy.  The 
objective of a number of China‟s recent regulations or policy provisions is to 
prioritize technological development together with environment friendly 
activities, while export-oriented foreign investments are, if not discouraged, 
not as actively encouraged as was the case in the past.  By way of illustration 
of such a shift the new regulations of inward investment tend to promote 
quality of investment rather than sheer quantity.
17)
  At the same time, Chinese 
authorities are also trying to develop the Chinese market in an attempt to 
rebalance growth and to make it less dependent on external demand a more 
on domestic consumption.  
By affecting the conditions in which the two countries interact, this policy 
change will affect the structure of the game being played by the two 
countries and impact Korea‟s economic strategy in the three areas described 
earlier.  
First of all, Korea will need to shift away from an almost exclusive (at 
least very heavy) reliance on exports of parts and components and towards 
enhancing exports of consumer goods.  Korea‟s challenge is to take the 
appropriate steps to enhance firms‟ competitiveness and help them make the 
best of the potentially huge Chinese market.  The next step is managing to 
design an appropriate strategy that maintains a competitive edge.  Beyond 
specific micro strategies, such as brand name promotion, or niche market 
strategy, Korean firms also need some public support in the form of a more 
investment-friendly environment, as well as more comprehensive measures 
addressing the development of human capital, and the promotion of venture 
capital.  To that end, industrial and innovation policies are needed. 
Secondly, as China develops and gets richer, it will be seen increasingly as 
a viable market.  It is worth emphasizing at this stage that accessing the 
Chinese market does not necessarily imply moving all stages of production 
                                                          
17) See Nicolas (2008b) for more details on the shift in China‟s investment regulations.  
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into China.  Korean firms can perfectly cater to the Chinese market through 
exports rather than through FDI.  The choice between these two strategies 
should be based on cost conditions.  Of course, other barriers may bias the 
choice in favor of local production, leading to a sub-optimal resource 
allocation.  This is one of the reasons why the implementation of a FTA with 
China, which would go beyond tariff elimination, would be a welcome step.  
Removing trade barriers with China would obviously contribute to a better 
exploitation of the market as well as to a better allocation of resources, 
helping in particular to maintain more sophisticated activities in Korea rather 
than relocating them systematically in China in order to circumvent trade 
barriers.  In particular it is not at all obvious that Korean carmakers made an 
optimal decision by setting up large production facilities in China.  While 
this may be appropriate for low range goods, which can definitely be 
produced at better-cost conditions in China, such may not be the case for 
higher-end products, which may be produced more efficiently in Korea.  
Depending on the type of products, exports will have to be preferred over 
FDI.  
Lastly, with China shifting away from being a mere assembly platform for 
re-exporting and towards becoming both a market in its own right and a full-
fledged competitor on third markets, the exchange rate  issue will need to be 
solved differently than in the past.  In these two cases, since bilateral trade 
flows can be expected to become increasingly sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations, the case for exchange rate cooperation/stabilization is also likely 
to rise.  For instance, as the two countries get increasingly in competition in 
third markets such as the US, cooperation will become increasingly advisable, 
otherwise the risk is high that one country engaging in competitive 
devaluation or manipulation of its currency may lead the other to follow suit 
and there will be coordination by chance rather than by design and with no 
structured joint response in case of turbulence.  Broadly speaking the 
emergence of a new division of labor and of different market patterns is 
likely to enhance the scope for cooperation in different areas.   
In an attempt to rebalance its growth, and to reduce its dependence on 
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external markets in response to the current global economic crisis, China 
may be seeking to further boost its internal market.  These efforts will result 
in an expansion of the regional market and Korean firms will need to adjust 
to the new pattern of demand.  For instance, China‟s domestic demand for 
home electronics and automobiles is increasing at a rapid pace thanks to a 
variety of government policies, including the “home electronics and 
automobiles to the countryside”18) policy.  With this in mind, Korean 
companies need to place more focus on developing and marketing mid- and 
low-priced customized products with superior basic functions and high 
quality. 
Another important change resulting from the crisis is the potential 
expansion of a regional market.  In this respect, pushing for a China-Korea 
FTA may be instrumental in helping turn the region into a market rather than 
a sheer production base.  Moreover the case for an FTA may also be more 
compelling because of the perceived need to reduce the dependence on the 
US market in the wake of the crisis.  
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The Korea-China trade and investment structure has been shown to be 
unusual in many respects.  First, Korea‟s exports to China are primarily 
designated for re-exporting abroad after processing in China rather than for 
meeting China‟s domestic demand.  As a result, parts, components and 
intermediate goods account for the bulk of Korea‟s exports to China, and 
Korea-China trade is essentially intra-industry trade.  Second, China has 
emerged as the main destination of Korea‟s outward direct investment since 
the early 2000s.  Third, a substantial share of Korean exports to China is 
purchased by Korean-invested firms operating in China.  Fourth, exports by 
                                                          
18) As part of the campaign “to send electronics down to the country side,” a 13% rebate is 
given to rural households on purchases of TVs, cell phones and computers.  Also, subsidies 
for the purchases of cars and home appliances to replace older models have been tested in a 
number of rural areas before being extended to all rural areas and lastly to major cities. 
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Korean-invested firms in China are primarily targeted to the US market and 
tend to crowd out direct Korean exports to the US. 
The specific nature of the de facto integration between China and Korea 
directly impacts the chances for de jure economic cooperation between the 
two economies.  It has been argued that the highly complementary 
relationship prevailing to date does not provide a strong rationale for formal 
cooperation neither in the exchange rate nor in the trade area.  However, as 
China gradually seeks to rebalance its growth strategy and in particular to 
reduce its dependence on processing trade, the two economies may shift 
away from being largely complementary to being increasingly in competition.  
Paradoxically this may pave the way for closer government-led economic 
cooperation.  
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